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LAW CLERKS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
ALBERT YOON* 
This Essay highlights the evolving institutional changes in the federal 
judiciary—a protracted confirmation process, higher caseload demands, 
and declining real salaries—in concurrence with evidence suggesting 
greater reliance by judges on their law clerks when writing opinions.  
These dynamic forces arguably undermine the integrity of the judicial 
process and counsel for legislative action to address judicial working 
conditions or for changes by judges in the hiring of law clerks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
As with other branches of the federal government, the judiciary 
represents a balance between the institution and the individual.  The 
judiciary is comprised of district courts and courts of appeals.  As a 
formal matter, judges within each jurisdiction (i.e., courts of appeals or 
district courts) stand equal to one another, irrespective of experience, 
age, or other criteria.  Cases are randomly assigned to the judges, and 
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Toronto Faculty of Law.  This research was made 
possible with generous funding from the Law School Admissions Council.  Ben Alarie, 
Andrew Green, Anthony Niblett, Jeffrey Rosenthal, Simon Stern, and participants at the 
Marquette University Law School Symposium on judicial clerks provided helpful comments.  
James Elcombe provided excellent research assistance.  All remaining errors are those of the 
author. 
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decisions from any individual judge or panel establish precedent that 
other judges within the jurisdiction follow.1 
At the same time, the individual judges that comprise the federal 
judiciary are highly independent.  While decisions are subject to appeal, 
judges enjoy largely unfettered autonomy in how they go about their 
jobs on a daily basis, including the process by which they write opinions.  
A few judges are reputed to write their own opinions,2 but recent 
evidence suggests that judges—including Justices—increasingly rely on 
their clerks when writing opinions.3 
Several possible explanations account for judges’ greater reliance on 
clerks.  One explanation is workload: district and circuit judges have 
markedly higher caseloads than their predecessors.4  Another is 
incentives and selection: judicial salaries have declined in real dollars 
since 1969 and have lagged even more so relative to elite legal practice 
and even academia.5 
The reliance on law clerks for substantive parts of judging is 
arguably exacerbated by the relatively homogenous demographic profile 
of the typical law clerk: young, inexperienced, and newly graduated 
from law school.  Other branches have designed a more heterogeneous 
composition of staffers and aides; given their reliance on clerks, this 
Essay argues that judges might benefit from a similar approach, absent 
other institutional change. 
This Essay proceeds as follows.  Part II looks at the judiciary from 
the economic perspective as a production function, where judges work 
closely with their law clerks to produce judicial decisions.  Part III 
discusses a typical judicial chambers, based on the known demographic 
characteristics of judges and law clerks, creating a work environment 
that juxtaposes older, experienced judges with younger, largely 
 
1.  See, e.g., Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s 
Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1161–62 (2005) 
(describing how individual federal courts follow their own precedents). 
2.  See Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Ghostwriting: Authorship on the 
Supreme Court, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1307, 1325 (2011) (showing low writing variability for 
Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook); see also Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which 
Judges Write Their Opinions (And Should We Care)?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077, 1119 
(2005) (reaching the same conclusion relying on case citation patterns).  
3.  See Rosenthal & Yoon, supra note 2, at 1318–25 (showing increasing variability in 
writing of Supreme Court Justices over time). 
4.  See infra Figure 1. 
5.  See Albert Yoon, Love’s Labor’s Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court Judges: 
1945–2000, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1029, 1038 fig.3 (2003) (showing comparison of annual judicial 
salaries with other legal and non-legal jobs). 
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inexperienced clerks.  Part IV discusses implications of this bimodal 
composition, particularly given evidence suggesting that judges are 
increasingly relying on their clerks in the drafting of opinions.  Part V 
discusses two approaches to improving the federal judiciary’s 
institutional design.  Part VI concludes. 
II. THE JUDICIARY AS A PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
One way to think about the federal judiciary is as a production 
function.  The federal courts produce judicial decisions, which can vary 
in length from an order to an opinion.  While litigants, witnesses, and 
legal counsel play important roles in any judicial system, judges are the 
primary input, and their judicial decisions are the output.  Technological 
advances may facilitate judges’ work, as it does with lawyers generally, 
but judges remain responsible for determining which parties prevail and, 
in the case of opinion writing, the reasons justifying their decisions. 
To say that judges are responsible for judicial decisions, however, is 
not the same as saying that they alone produce their decisions.  They 
have the help of judicial clerks, the vast majority of whom at the federal 
level work full time for an individual judge.  Clerks’ scope of work has 
evolved over the years, from a primarily administrative function in the 
early twentieth century to writing bench memoranda, preparing for trial 
or oral argument, and in many cases drafting published opinions today.6 
Under this framework, the federal judiciary faces a big challenge.  
Over time, its docket has steadily increased.  Figure 1 reports the 
aggregate federal judicial caseload for district courts and courts of 
appeals, based on cases terminated annually from 1900 through 2013.  
Over the past century, the number of terminated district court cases 
increased over eleven-fold, from just under 30,000 in 1900 to nearly 
325,000 in 2013; at the appellate level, this increase was over sixty-four 
times greater in 2013 (58,393) than in 1900 (917).7  To place these 
 
6.  For an excellent discussion of the evolution of Supreme Court law clerks, see TODD 
C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 38–205 (2006) (discussing how law clerks transitioned from 
stenographer to legal assistant to law firm associate); ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, 
SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT 200–36 (2006) (discussing law clerks transitioning from research assistants to junior 
justices); see also IN CHAMBERS: STORIES OF SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS AND THEIR 
JUSTICES (Todd C. Peppers & Artemus Ward, eds.) (2012). 
7.  The Federal Judicial Center publishes caseload statistics.  Historical Caseloads in the 
Federal Courts, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/caseload.nsf/page/caseloads_main
_page (last visited Oct. 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/J8VL-HG93. 
 134 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:131 
increases in context, the population in the United States grew only by a 
factor of four, from 76 million in 1900 to 317 million in 2013.8 
The increased caseload demands are all the more daunting given 
that the number of authorized judgeships grew only modestly during this 
period.  Figure 2 shows that the number of authorized district judges 
grew by roughly a factor of ten, from 67 in 1900 to 663 in 2013.  
Authorized circuit judges, by comparison, increased only by a factor of 
six, from 28 in 1900 to 167 in 2013.9  For the courts of appeals, which 
focus on writing opinions, the growth in caseload far outpaced the 
increase in authorized judgeships. 
Determining the exact caseload demands for judges is elusive.  
Senior judges—judges who have vacated their seat after vesting in their 
pension10—assist active judges by continuing to hear cases, albeit often 
on a part-time basis.  Moreover, the federal judiciary has increased its 
administrative support, expanding the number of non-Article III judges 
in the areas of bankruptcy, tax, and pre-trial matters (i.e., magistrate 
judges).11  The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts does not 
publish individual judge statistics, but recent scholarship suggests that 
senior judges hear on average 60% of the caseload of an active judge.12  
While senior judges help alleviate some of the caseload demands, active  
 
8.  The U.S. Census Bureau provides historical data on the U.S. population.  Population 
Estimates: Historical Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popest/data/histori
cal/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/67A3-DL9W. 
9.  The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts publishes statistics on the number of 
authorized judgeships.  Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Authorized Judgeships, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs/all-judgeships.pdf (last visited Oct. 
26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ZVB7-KPF6. 
10.  For a discussion of senior judges and the factors that influence their tenure 
decisions, see Albert Yoon, As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the Political Economy 
of Judicial Tenure, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 495 (2005); Albert Yoon, Pensions, Politics, 
and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of Federal Judges, 1869–2002, 8 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 143, 146–47 (2006).  For an argument against the constitutionality of senior judges, see 
David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
453 (2007). 
11.  Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts, 39 
VAL. U. L. REV. 661, 674 (2005). 
12.  See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Policy of Judicial 
Retirement: An Empirical Study, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 111, 141 (2013). 
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Figure 1 
Article III Judicial Caseload 
Terminated by Year-End (1900–2013) 
 
Figure 2 
Article III Authorized Judgeships 
 (1900–2013) 
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judges—particularly at the appellate level—nevertheless are 
responsible for a higher caseload than their predecessors. 
Given these increased caseload demands, federal clerks serve a 
much-needed role in helping judges prepare for and decide cases.  While 
the significance of Supreme Court clerks is well-documented,13 clerks at 
the district courts and courts of appeals remain largely unexplored.  A 
comprehensive inquiry is beyond the scope of this Essay, but it is worth 
examining more closely the role of clerks generally within the 
institutional judicial structure. 
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF JUDGES AND CLERKS 
A judicial chambers is like a small law firm.14  The judge is the senior 
partner, and the clerks are akin to the junior associates.15  The judge is 
also the proverbial name partner, and all work product (i.e., orders, 
opinions) that comes from the chambers bears only the judge’s name.16  
The means by which the chambers produce this work product, however, 
often reflects effort by the clerks.17 
Continuing with the idea of judicial chambers as a small law firm, we 
can think of the federal judiciary as a labor market consisting of a small 
number of clerks and an even smaller number of judges.  This analogy to 
the judiciary as operating within a broader labor market also reflects the 
thinking of Chief Justice Roberts and his predecessor, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.  Both jurists have expressed their concerns that the 
institutional challenges facing the courts could impede the ability of the 
judiciary to attract high-ability members of the bar and to retain them 
once they are appointed.18  
 
13.  See PEPPERS, supra note 6; WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 6.  For a seminal earlier 
account, see BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE 
SUPREME COURT (1979). 
14.  See PEPPERS, supra note 6, 145–205. 
15.  Id. at 145. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. 
18.  See John G. Roberts, Jr., 2006 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THIRD 
BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.), Jan. 2007, at 1, 1–4; William H. 
Rehnquist, 2002 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office 
of the U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.), Jan. 2003, at 1, 1–3. 
 2014] CLERKS AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 137 
Table 1 
Profile of Current Article III Judges 
 
The current demographic profile of a typical federal judge, 
illustrated in Table 1,19 is a white male roughly fifty years old.  Federal 
judges are often selected from other courts.  Nearly a third of federal 
judges, prior to joining the federal bench, were state judges.  Another 
30% were in private practice, and roughly 15% were prosecutors at the 
federal or state level.  Law graduates of Yale, Harvard, and Stanford are 
disproportionately represented on the federal judiciary, increasingly so 
as one elevates from the district courts to the courts of appeals to the 
Supreme Court.  Earlier studies contend that the federal judiciary, 
notwithstanding the changing economic and legal climate, has remained 
relatively stable with respect to entering characteristics.20 
Statistics for judicial clerks, by contrast, are hard to find.  The 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts does not publish statistics on 
clerks.  The information that does exist is primarily at the level of the 
Supreme Court; information about court of appeals and district court 
clerks is primarily descriptive and typically provided in the forum of law 
review tributes.21  A back of the envelope calculation for 2014 suggests 
somewhere in the neighborhood of 2,500 law clerks, given the current 
 
19.  All statistics regarding federal judges, unless otherwise stated, come from the 
Federal Judicial Center.  For the raw data, see Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 
1789–Present, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ZN3J-KYYT [hereinafter Biographical 
Directory].  This data includes both active and senior Article III judges.  (One can export the 
full dataset of the biographical directory by clicking on the link on this page entitled, 
“Download an export of all data in the Biographical Directory of Federal Judges.”) 
20.  On observable characteristics, it appears that selection into the judiciary has 
remained stable, as has judicial tenure.  See Yoon, supra note 5, at 1032. 
21.  Todd C. Peppers, Micheal W. Giles & Bridget Tainer-Parkins, Inside Judicial 
Chambers: How Federal District Court Judges Select and Use Their Law Clerks, 71 ALB. L. 
REV. 623, 623–24 (2008). 
Court
Number of 
Appoint-
ments
Age at 
Comm-
ission
Current 
Age Female
Non-
White
Attended Yale, 
Harvard, or 
Stanford law 
school Judge
Private 
Practice
Prose-
cutor
USDC 1,067 50 67 0.24 0.20 0.13 0.34 0.30 0.16
USCA 279 48 69 0.24 0.18 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.15
USSC 12 45 72 0.33 0.17 0.83 0.17 0.08 0.17
Job Prior to Joining Bench
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composition of active and senior judges at both levels.22  Thus, there are 
approximately two clerks for every federal judge (active and senior). 
A judicial clerkship is, in most instances, short term.  A recent 
survey of federal judges found that roughly half the judges (49%) hired 
clerks for one to two years, and a comparable percentage (48%) hired 
clerks for two years.23  A majority of judges surveyed also included a 
permanent clerk as part of this group.24  A 2000 study reported that 
women comprised 46% of the law clerks,25 and 12% were non-white.26  
Clerks in the cohort category 26 to 30 represented 71% of respondents.27  
The prevalence of this age category suggests that the vast majority of 
law clerks have just graduated from law school.  Judges’ apparent 
fascination with new law graduates has created a hiring frenzy amongst 
law students, which neither law schools nor the judiciary appears able to 
remedy.28 
 
22.  As of July 28, 2014, the Federal Judicial Center reported having 616 district and 158 
court of appeals judges on active status.  See Biographical Directory, supra note 19.  District 
judges have on average 2 law clerks and circuit judges 3–4 clerks (depending on whether the 
judge elects to have 1 or 2 secretaries).  There are approximately 550 senior judges, id., and 
their number of clerks is typically 1–2 but depends on the caseload.  In 2007, the 
Administrative Office reported 2,075 full-time law clerks at the district level.  See Peppers et 
al., supra note 21, at 628 (citing Telephone Interview with Staff Member, Admin. Office of 
the U.S. Courts (Oct. 12, 2007)). 
23.  See Peppers et al., supra note 21, at 632–33. 
24.  See Peppers et al., supra note 21, at 633. 
25.  See Clerkship Study Tables 46–66, NALP, http://www.nalp.org/clrktb46_66#46 (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/444V-HHJA.  The National Association for 
Law Placement (NALP) in 2000 surveyed recent law graduates doing a post-graduate judicial 
clerkship.  Courting Clerkships: The NALP Judicial Clerkship Study, NALP (Oct. 2000), 
http://www.nalp.org/courtingclerkships, archived at http://perma.cc/N8CN-ZT75 [hereinafter 
Courting Clerkships].  For the results of this survey, see Clerkship Study Tables 46–66, supra.  
NALP distributed this study in January 2000 to 14,000 third-year law students and 4,000 law 
school graduates.  Courting Clerkships, supra.  The response rate was 11% for law students 
and 24% for law graduates.  Id.  One limitation of this study is that it does not report the 
breakdown of most statistics between federal versus other (state, local, and international) 
clerkships.  Federal clerkships comprise approximately 55% of the respondents in this survey.  
Clerkship Study Tables 46–66, supra. 
26.  Clerkship Study Tables 46–66, supra note 25. 
27.  Id. 
28.  For a discussion of the problems of the judicial clerkship hiring practice, a hiring 
timeline constructed by law schools, and the defection of federal judges from this policy, see 
Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The Market for 
Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 793, 838 (2001) [hereinafter Avery et al, The 
Market]; Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The New 
Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 447 (2007) [hereinafter Avery et 
al., The New Market]; Edward R. Becker, Stephen G. Breyer & Guido Calabresi, The Federal 
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Compared with their counterparts in the Executive and Legislative 
Branches, law clerks represent a younger and more concentrated 
demographic, at least with respect to age and tenure.  Matching 2013 
Executive employees to those approximating judicial clerks—based on 
educational attainment—the executive branch similarly is 56% male.29  
The age demographics in the Executive Branch reflect an older modal 
group (30 to 34 years old) but with a broad range of ages: 15% were 
below age 25, 46% were between ages 25 and 39, 35% were between 
ages 40 and 60, and 4% were above age 60.30  The average length of 
service was 14 years, with the top quarter serving more than 23 years, 
and the bottom quintile serving five years or fewer.31 
A 2001 study of Senate legislative staffers suggested a labor pool 
situated between law clerks and executive employees.32  Finding a 
precise comparable cohort to law clerks is difficult.  Legislative 
correspondents are comprised primarily by those with an undergraduate 
degree as their highest educational attainment, with an average age of 
25.33  Legislative counsel is reserved for those with law degrees, with an 
average age of 35, predominantly male (65%), white (88%), single 
(65%), and without children (82%).34 
These demographic differences across the branches of government 
reflect a demographically narrower labor market for law clerks than for 
their counterparts in the Executive or Congress.  Judicial clerks typically 
take the job immediately or shortly after graduating from law school 
and work for one or two years, whereas Executive and Legislative 
employees are typically older and have worked longer.  This difference 
is likely motivated in part by design.  Judges are free to hire whatever 
type of law graduate they like, but they clearly express a collective 
 
Judicial Law Clerk Hiring Problem and the Modest March 1 Solution, 104 YALE L.J. 207 
(1994). 
29.  The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) provides statistics on employees in 
the Executive Branch.  U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Data, Analysis & Documentation: Raw 
Datasets, OPM.GOV, http://www.opm.gov/data (last visited Oct. 26, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/U59H-CQCK.  All information discussed in this Essay is drawn from OPM’s 
raw employment data for June 2013. 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. 
32.  See CONGRESSIONAL MANAGEMENT FOUNDATION, 2001 SENATE STAFF 
EMPLOYMENT STUDY 33−36 (2001), http://www.congressfoundation.org/storage/documents/
CMF_Pubs/cmfsenatesalarystudy2001.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3ZDR-BYDC. 
33.  Id. at 34.  Nearly 90% of legislative correspondents have a bachelor’s degree as their 
highest educational attainment.  See id. 
34.  See id. at 36. 
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preference for hiring recent law graduates, and disproportionately from 
Yale, Harvard, or Stanford law schools.35  It is also worth noting that a 
sizable fraction of former Article III clerks (12%) become Article III 
judges later in their careers,36 in some instances in relatively short 
order.37 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STRUCTURE 
The institutional structure of judicial chambers presents clear 
benefits and potential drawbacks.  The benefits are numerous: a small, 
intimate working environment in which the judge can work closely with 
her clerks.  By predominantly hiring recent law graduates, the judge 
may find it easier to create a work environment to her liking, since 
clerks will be less likely to hold fixed views on legal practice based on 
their own experience in other work environments.  Hiring recent law 
graduates also affords judges the opportunity to learn recent 
developments in the common law indirectly from the legal academy, 
which offers a more theoretical perspective on the law than typically 
presented by the practicing bar.  Lastly, hiring young clerks provides the 
beginning of what may become an enriching, career-long relationship 
with the judge, as clerks subsequently embark on their own careers. 
The limitations represent the flip side of the benefits to youth.  What 
young clerks offer in the way of raw intelligence and energy, they lack in 
experience, and in some cases restraint.  The issue is not one of youth in 
itself, but rather the relative homogeneity in the age composition of 
clerks.  Figure 3 shows the distribution of active judges and senior 
judges as of 2014.  Active judges range in age from 39 to 91, with an 
average age of 61 (denoted by a vertical line); senior judges range in age 
from 65 to 98, with an average age of 78 (denoted by a vertical line). The 
  
 
35.  Based on employment data from Martindale Hubbell in 2012, a national directory of 
practicing lawyers, 3.3% of all Yale, Harvard, or Stanford graduates clerked on the federal 
courts, compared with 0.7% of all law graduates from all other schools.  (Data on file with 
author.) 
36.  This finding is based on biographical information provided by the Federal Judicial 
Center on its 3,503 commissioned judges, of whom 411 were former clerks.  This data is based 
as of July 15, 2014.  To access the raw data, see Biographical Directory, supra note 19. 
37.  For example, on March 31, 2014 the Senate confirmed John B. Owens, age 42, to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: John 
Byron Owens, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=3520&cid=999&ctyp
e=na&instate=na (last visited Oct. 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/GWQ6-TRKL. 
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Figure 3 
Distribution of Judges and Clerks 
 
current age distribution of clerks is unknown, but based on prior 
statistics, clerks range between 2,000 and 2,500 in number and largely 
fall between the ages of 26 and 30.38 
Taken together, judicial chambers on average reflect a stark bimodal 
distribution of older, experienced judges and younger, inexperienced 
clerks.  There is effectively no middle cohort.  The judiciary stands in 
contrast to other branches of government, where staffers range in age 
and are more likely to remain on the job for more than one or two years.  
This gap in experience and age, by itself, need not present grounds for 
concern.  Rather, it becomes relevant only when looking at the 
allocation of labor within each chamber. 
With few exceptions,39 former clerks treat the operation of judicial 
chambers as confidential.40  Recent work by scholars, however, suggests 
 
38.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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that law clerks are playing an increasingly larger role in the opinion-
writing process.  Interviews with former clerks support this claim.41  
Other scholars reaching similar conclusions have used judges’ case 
citation patterns in written opinions as a proxy for the judges’ own 
writing (as opposed to that of their clerks), or compared draft opinions 
to the final version.42  Others compare the ideology of justices and their 
clerks to gauge clerks’ influence on substantive decision making.43  
More recent efforts have used textual analysis to use writing 
variability as a proxy for clerks’ influence.44  Analyzing the frequency of 
common function words—such as “some,” “their,” “have”—that vary 
across writers, recent scholarship has found that over time the writing 
variability of judges has increased.45  Figure 4 shows the year-to-year 
writing variability scores of select Justices.46  A general pattern emerges: 
Justices from earlier periods have a lower writing variability, both within 
and across years, than more recent Justices.  For example, Justices 
Holmes, Cardozo, and Douglas have the lowest writing variability of the 
Justices shown.  By contrast, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, the most 
recent Justices in the sample, have the highest variability. 
The intuition behind the significance of writing variability is that 
each Justice, like any author, has a distinct writing style.  This style—
based on function words—stands independent of the area of the law or 
the length of opinion.  The lower the score, the more likely the Justice is 
writing her own opinions.  Correspondingly, the higher the score, the 
more likely the Justice is relying on her law clerks in the opinion-writing  
 
39.  See, e.g., EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE 
OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT (Penguin Books 1999) (1998) (describing the experience 
clerking on the Supreme Court). 
40.  PEPPERS, supra note 6, at 18. 
41.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
42.  See Choi & Gulati, supra note 2, at 1111–16; Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II 
& Lee Sigelman, Ghostwriters on the Court? A Stylistic Analysis of U.S. Supreme Court 
Opinion Drafts, 30 AM. POL. RES. 166, 172 (2002). 
43.  See Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court 
Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51, 60 (2008). 
44.  See Rosenthal & Yoon, supra note 2. 
45.  Id. at 1314 tbl.1, 1337.  For an explanation of the methodology used to construct a 
writing variability measure, see id. at 1313–17. 
46.  Figure 4 is taken from Rosenthal & Yoon, supra note 2, at 1324 fig.2. 
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Figure 4 
Year-to-Year Writing Variability Scores  
(Select Justices) 
 
process, with the idea that the more writers participating in the drafting 
of the opinion the higher the variability in the writing. 
One must take caution against interpreting these results too 
strongly, as it may be the case that some judges possess a writing style 
that is highly variable.  Two current examples suggest that these writing 
scores correlate with reliance on clerks.  Judges Posner and Easterbrook 
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit are both reputed 
to write their own opinions.47  Their scores are consistent within and 
across years and appear similar to Justices Holmes and Cardozo.48 
If judges increasingly rely on their clerks, beyond performing 
research and writing bench memos to include writing the opinions 
themselves, then clerks in effect play an increasing role in the 
 
47.  Id. at 1325. 
48.  See id. at 1326 fig.3. 
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development of the common law.  While judges themselves are 
ultimately responsible for the opinions they write, sharing this 
responsibility and authority—even if only in part—with young, 
inexperienced lawyers may run counter to the optimal development of 
the common law. 
V. IMPROVING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY’S INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN  
If federal judges are indeed relying more on their clerks when 
writing opinions, there are two possible responses.  The bolder response 
is to ameliorate or reverse this reliance.  The second, more modest, 
response is to accept this reliance as given but propose steps to mitigate 
any adverse effects. 
If the goal is to reduce judges’ reliance on clerks, one solution is to 
promote a culture where judges collectively take a more active role in 
writing opinions.  Using writing variability as a proxy, some modern-day 
jurists exhibit this quality: recently retired Justice Stevens and Judges 
Posner and Easterbrook, to name a few.  Changing this culture, 
however, may prove difficult, if not impossible.  The Constitution does 
not mandate how judges perform their role (or even the existence of 
clerks).  Not surprisingly, judges do not report or disclose the process by 
which they write their opinions.  Congress or the Chief Justice could 
provide guidelines for the proper reliance on clerks, but they would 
merely be advisory.  Given their response to proposed changes 
regarding clerkship hiring,49 judges may be reluctant to follow 
recommendations on their use of clerks.50  
Another solution that may reduce reliance on clerks is to increase 
what federal judges earn.  Figure 5 reports judicial salaries in constant 
dollars since 1913.  Judicial salaries are not pegged to cost-of-living 
adjustments but subject to increases enacted by Congress.  The graph 
illustrates two trends.  The first is that any given nominal salary 
decreases in real dollars until Congress provides a raise.  The second is a  
 
49.  The hiring process for judicial clerks is one such example where judges could not 
collectively comply with hiring timelines for judicial clerks.  See Becker et al., supra note 28; 
Avery et al., The Market, supra note 28; Avery et al., The New Market, supra note 28.  Judge 
Alex Kozinski is unabashed in his rejection of any reforms to the judicial hiring process.  
See Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 YALE L.J. 1707, 1730 (1991). 
50.  See Carl Tobias, Commentary, Salvaging the 2013 Federal Law Clerk Hiring Season, 
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 243, 246 (2013) (describing the defection amongst a subset of judges 
that compromised the integrity of the judicial clerkship hiring model). 
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Figure 5 
Article III Judicial Salaries 
1913–2014 (2014 Dollars) 
 
secular downward trend in real salaries since 1969, reflecting modest 
upward adjustments. 
The recent trend in judicial salaries actually understates the broader 
gap between judges and other elite areas of the law.  Judicial salaries 
were once comparable to those of partners at most elite law firms.  Over 
time, the disparity has grown.51  In 2013, partners at the top 100 law 
firms—based on The American Lawyer—on average earned profits of 
nearly $1.5 million.52  The relative decline in judicial salaries is 
exacerbated by an even greater decline relative to the elite private bar, 
prompting alarm from the corporate bar, the American Bar Association, 
and legal academics.53  Some scholars, however, are skeptical that 
 
51.  Thomas J. Forr, Comment, Want Less Ideology on the Federal Bench? Pay Judges 
More, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 859, 860 (2010). 
52.  Aric Press, The Super Rich Get Richer, AM. LAW., May 2014, at 130 (reporting 
profits per partner as $1.47 million). 
53.  Scott Baker, Should We Pay Federal Circuit Judges More?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 63, 65 
nn.2–5 (2008). 
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judicial pay bears any relation to the quality of judicial decision 
making.54 
A third alternative solution to reduce reliance on clerks, one that 
assumes that judges respond to external factors, is to reduce their 
caseload demands.  The sheer number of cases has compelled the 
federal judiciary to adopt ways of triaging the docket by relegating more 
work to court clerks, non-Article III judges, mediation, telephonic 
hearings, etc.55  Scholars have characterized this trend as a 
bureaucratization of the judiciary,56 which “weaken[s] the judge’s 
individual sense of responsibility.”57  A smaller caseload would allow 
judges more time for each case, which in turn would allow more time for 
deliberation and, more importantly, opinion writing. 
As a remedial response, the President and Congress could work 
together to reduce the number of judicial vacancies.  As of October 
2014, there were 53 vacancies on the district courts and 7 vacancies on 
the courts of appeals.58  This current number of vacancies, however 
troubling, is certainly a well-established phenomenon and actually 
represents an improvement over prior years, when the number of 
vacancies in a given year exceeded 100.59 
Thinking more prospectively, Congress could increase the number of 
authorized Article III judges, which have lagged behind the growth in 
federal cases.  It may be that identifying judicial understaffing based on 
case filings understates the problem to the extent that the growing 
docket discourages prospective litigants from filing suit.  The Senate 
recently considered the Federal Judgeship Act of 2013, which would 
have created seventy new judgeships (sixty-five district; five circuit) 
 
54.  See id. at 112. 
55.  See David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate over 
Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1669, 1673 (2005) (discussing judicial 
delegation). 
56.  See Jon O. Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals to Preserve the 
Federal Judicial System, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 766 (1989). 
57.  Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1456 
(1983). 
58.  Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Vacancies, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4Z4M-LW26. 
59.  See DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS & MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., JUDICIAL NOMINATION STATISTICS: U.S. DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS 10 tbl.1 
(2004) (reporting, for example, that in 1979 the district courts had 119 vacancies and the 
courts of appeals had 38 vacancies, representing a total vacancy rate of 24%). 
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recommended by the Judicial Council, but the legislation stalled in the 
Senate Judiciary Committee without a vote.60 
Based on recent history, the chances of an increase in judgeships are 
unlikely.  The number of district court judgeships has held constant 
since 2003 and the number of court of appeals judgeships constant since 
1990.61  Moreover, some members of Congress are in favor of reducing 
rather than expanding the federal judiciary.  In 2013, Senator Grassley 
renewed calls to again reduce the number of judges on the D.C. 
Circuit,62 following recent legislation in 2008 that reduced the number of 
authorized judgeships from twelve to eleven.63 
If it is not possible to change how judges rely on clerks, either 
through changing judicial culture or by easing the judges’ workload 
demands, then an alternative is to encourage judges to adopt a more 
diverse hiring approach.  Rather than rely predominantly on the most 
recent cohort of law graduates, they could hire clerks who have 
practiced for a few years, or longer, in government, public interest, or 
the private sector.  Older law clerks bring a potentially broader 
perspective to chambers, informed by their own legal experiences.  They 
may also bring more maturity to chambers, both professionally and 
personally. 
One advantage of hiring older clerks, at least in part, is that it 
enables judges to make more informed selections.  Hiring clerks right 
out of law school means that judges make this decision based almost 
solely on the clerks’ performance during law school, in some instances 
 
60.  Federal Judgeship Act of 2013, S. 1385, 113th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2013), 
https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/s1385/BILLS-113s1385is.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5J
6B-L4NB.  For the text of the Federal Judgeship Act of 2013 and its legislative history, see All 
Bill Information (Except Text) for S. 1385—Federal Judgeship Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1385/all-info (last visited Oct. 26, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/U7RR-SAJW; S. 1385: Federal Judgeship Act of 2013, 
GOVTRACK.US https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1385# (last visited Oct. 26, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/LG3J-7JC8. 
61.  See supra Figure 2. 
62.  See Glenn Kessler, Is the D.C. Circuit Last in ‘Almost Every Category’?, WASH. 
POST (June 6, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/is-the-
dc-circuit-last-in-almost-every-category/2013/06/05/a589b186-ce22-11e2-8f6b-67f40e176f03_bl
og.html, archived at http://perma.cc/U9M4-VQXK. 
63.  Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, 121 Stat. 2534, 2543 
(2008); see also U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_coa_circuit_dc.html (last visited Oct. 26, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/D6V8-68DX (describing the history in the number of 
authorized judgeships). 
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their performance during only their first year.64  The performance 
during school is undoubtedly correlated with how one would perform 
during a clerkship, but it may lead in some instances to false positives 
(i.e., a clerk who performed well at school but not at her clerkship).  
More significantly, the current emphasis on recent law graduates does 
not allow much for the false negative: the student whose performance 
during law school belies her ability as a lawyer and, correspondingly, a 
clerk. 
A possible rejoinder against hiring older law clerks is that judges are 
not looking for junior colleagues, but rather faithful—albeit highly 
intelligent—agents to the judges.  Clerks hired right out of law school, 
both because of youth and inexperience, may better perform this role.  
But the tradeoff for youth and fealty is added knowledge and maturity, 
which the other branches of government implicitly value when hiring 
staff.  There is no ex ante reason to believe that the agency concerns of 
judges should differ from those of a member of Congress or the 
President. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Essay explores the institutional structure of the federal 
judiciary and the considerable demands it imposes on both judges and 
clerks.  Over the past fifty years, as the ratio of case filings to authorized 
judges has steadily grown, judges increasingly rely on their clerks when 
preparing for cases and writing opinions.  While the allure of clerking is 
perhaps heightened by this greater responsibility, the market for federal 
judges is arguably less attractive: an excoriating confirmation process 
and, for those confirmed, greater work demands coupled with lower 
compensation.  
The current system of older judges hiring young, typically 
inexperienced clerks stands in contrast to other branches of government 
and arguably impedes rather than promotes judges’ ability to perform 
their role.  This juxtaposition poses a problem for which there is no easy 
solution.  One approach is a Congressional response: Congress can 
increase the number of authorized judges to address the greater 
workload or increase judicial compensation with the hope of attracting 
individuals capable of writing their own opinions—e.g., Judges Richard 
 
64.  See Patricia M. Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L. REV. 152, 156 (1990) 
(describing how the clerkship process has over time shifted from law students’ third year to 
their second year). 
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Posner, Frank Easterbrook—notwithstanding the caseload.  The other 
approach is for judges to take it upon themselves to hire more 
experienced clerks. 
Neither response appears likely, given the current political and 
judicial landscape.  The cost of maintaining the current system, however, 
represents a lost opportunity to strengthen the judiciary and, in so 
doing, potentially weakens the judicial process and the development of 
the common law. 
